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Inquiry & Analysis - Iraq/Reform
March 30, 2004
No. 168
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Iraqi Kurds at Crossroads
By Nimrod Raphaeli*
Introduction
With an uncommon degree of frankness and transparency permitted only
occasionally in the former Iraqi daily Babil, which was owned by
Saddam's son Uday, a reporter filed an article from the Kurdish city of
Erbil entitled: "Iraqi Kurdistan [is] a State within a State -
Ambiguity Surrounds its Future."
He wrote: "This is supposedly an Iraqi land but no one utters the name
'Iraq'... Here they use cellular phones called Kurdistell, they watch
Kurdish Television... In officials' bureaus large maps hang on the wall
with Kurdistan inscribed in large letters, large enough to arouse the
ire of the neighboring countries... Kurdistan has escaped from
Baghdad's grip since the end of the 1991 war and is protected by the
American and British no-fly zone ... 3.6 million Kurds receive 18% of
oil revenues under the Oil for Food program. Kurdistan benefits from
illegal exports of oil to Turkey and from its commercial transactions
with Iran. We find in Kurdistan internet coffeehouses. There are 30
registered political parties. Its people argue that they enjoy freedom
unknown to neighboring countries... Unbelievable changes have taken
place here. Imagine: most of the children born after 1991 do not speak
Arabic... The surrounding neighboring countries of Syria, Turkey and
Iran do not wish to see [Kurdistan] as a model for their minorities.
Iraqi military forces are camped at the south of Kurdistan and would
not hesitate to attack it if they were able to. Since Turkey has hinted
of a military intervention in the north, the use of the word
'independence' is forbidden. 'We want democratic, multifaceted and
federal Iraq,' is the official line pronounced by Ibrahim Hassan, who
is in charge of public relations in the Kurdish Democratic Party headed
by Mas'oud Barazani. Kurdish officials repeat in private that
independence is not to their advantage even though they represent 23
million people - the largest group without a state in the Middle East.
Current circumstances require the Kurds to act with caution. If the
United States attacks Iraq, the ensuing confusion in the region will
deprive the Kurds of the benefits which have prevailed for ten years...
The Iraqi Kurds provide a cautious support to the United States against
Baghdad and they still covet the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul which
remain under the control of Baghdad... It is a
difficult balance between the dreams of independence and the
requirement for insuring the continuity which the Kurds are required to
maintain. [One official is quoted saying] 'We are hostage of American
moves.'"(1)
Although the Saddam regime has fallen and a new reality in Iraq is
evolving, the main thrust of the Babil article represents the Kurds'
current concerns and aspirations and reflects their achievements.
After 80 years of oppression by the various Iraqi regimes, the Kurds
were finally able to enjoy a considerable measure of political autonomy
and personal freedoms as consequence of the defeat of Iraq in the war
in Kuwait and the subsequent protection of their territory by the U.S.
and Britain under the no-fly zone program. The current debate in Iraq
about the relationship between the Kurds and Iraq remains very much the
way it was portrayed in the Babil article. It is a debate about the
Kurds' insistence for preservation of the accomplishments made since
1991 within a newly-constituted federalism in Iraq in which the Kurds
can maintain their national identity unfettered by intrusions from
Baghdad and without the constant threat of military action against them
by the Iraqi armed forces. These are also promises made to the Kurds by
their Iraqi partners in exile whose common goal was to overthrow
Saddam's regime and replace it with a federal form of government that
would fulfill the Kurds' political aspirations. As has often happened
to the Kurds in the past, former friends and allies appear ready to
renege on old promises and old understandings.
Regional Federalism vs. the Federalism of Provinces<b/>
While there is a consensus among most Iraqi political groups about the
establishment of a federal form of government in the post-Saddam Iraq,
there is a disagreement about the nature of such federalism. Without
exception, the non-Kurdish Iraqi majority favors the federalism of the
provinces. Iraq is divided into 18 provinces and, according to
this view, each province should have some degree of autonomy within a
federal framework that leaves much of the power at the center in
Baghdad. Since most provinces, including those in the north, have
a mixture of ethnic groups including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians
and Christians, this scheme will loosely limit the Kurdish
control over at most three provinces - Sulaymaniyya, Erbil and Dhouk -
that have enjoyed political autonomy since 1991.(2)
By contrast, the Kurds have insisted on regional federalism that would
bring into one region, and one political framework, all the provinces
with substantial Kurdish populations, including the oil producing city
of Kirkuk. The additional Kurdish insistence on keeping Kirkuk as part
of the regional federation scheme stems from their argument that the
city was historically a Kurdish city but has gone through a process of
Arabization under the Saddam regime. The idea of the federation of
provinces is rejected, according to Jalal Talabani, the leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party and a member of the Governing Council,
because "throughout its history, the Kurdish people have struggled to
prevent the separation of the Kurdish provinces from each other and to
protect the integrity of the historical Kurdish borders..."(3) In the
words of Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Governing Council, the
annexation of Kirkuk into a Kurdish region is not meant to "Kurdicize"
the city but to remove the relics of its Arabization. According to
Othman, the 1959 census has shown a majority of Kurds in Kirkuk and
that majority should be the sole criterion in determining its future.(4)
The Content of Federalism from a Kurdish Perspective
The debate about the nature of federalism in Iraq, regional vs.
provincial, revolves around three practical issues: First, the
application of the Iraqi law to the Kurdistan region; second, the
future of the Besh Merga, or the Kurdish militia comprising about
50,000 members under arm; and third, the Kurdish share in oil revenues
originating from the Kirkuk area.
Under the Kurdish scheme for regional federation, the Kurdish region
would include four provinces - Erbil, Kirkuk, Dhouk and Suleimaniyya,
in addition to a number of cities with Kurdish majorities in the
province of Mosul. The Kurds use the figures from the 1957 census which
showed them to constitute a majority with 48% of the population.
By contrast, the 1977 census, carried out by the Saddam regime and was
the last official census in Iraq, showed that the Kurds represented
37.6% while the Arabs were 44.4% and the Turkmen 16.3%.
The Application of Laws
The Kurds demand that laws enacted by the federal government not be
applied automatically to the Kurdish region unless they are approved by
the Kurdish local parliament. The Kurds remain suspicious of the
central authorities in Baghdad that would likely emerge after the
sovereignty is restored to the Iraqis. They want to anchor their
demands into written legal documents. They do not wish to be confronted
later with a fait accompli that might be harmful to their interests.
The Future of the Besh Merga
Through the history of the Iraqi state which came into being in 1920
the Kurds have been victims of Iraqi army incursions into their cities,
towns, and villages. Not only do the Kurds demand that no Iraqi army
should, in the future, enter their autonomous region but that they
should keep their militia, the Besh Merga as an independent force from
the future Iraqi army. The Kurdish position has run into objections
from members of the governing council and Ambassador Bremer.
Bremer has objected to any individual militias outside the national
army. As a compromise the Kurds would call the Besh Merga 'The National
Guard of Iraqi Kurdistan'. The Kurdish leaders would like to surrender
the nominal authority over the Guard to the national government but
keep the actual control in the hands of the regional Kurdish
government.(5) The future of the Kurdish as well as other militias is
currently being debated in Iraq although the Coalition Provisional
Authority insists that they should all be disbanded.
Kirkuk -The Center of Conflict
The oil rich city of Kirkuk is at the heart of the conflict concerning
Kurdish demand for federalism. In the decade of the nineties and the
first two years of this century, when the process of Arabization was at
its height, Saddam expelled as many as 150,000 and some say 250,000
Kurds and Turkmen to the southern regions of Iraq and replaced them
with Iraqi Arabs. The Kurds argue that, historically, Kirkuk had a
Kurdish majority and a de-Arbization will restore them to their
historical weight. The Turkmen, working closely with the Arabs, argue
that Kirkuk is a predominantly Turkmen city and should remain as part
of unified Iraq. Turkey supports their claims. "Kirkuk is the jewel in
the Kurdish throne and a powder keg concerning the unity of Iraq."(6)
In the eyes of an Iraqi daily, the controversy over Kirkuk has to do
with its oil. "Oil alone is the reason for the Kurdish insistence, Arab
refusal, Turkmen protests and the regional sternness. If Kirkuk were
not an oil city we would not have heard all the historical and
geographical arguments from all sides."(7) Ambassador Bremer has shared
the views of the majority of the members of the governing council that
the issue of Kirkuk should be resolved by the elected government.(8)
The Strength of the Kurdish Demands
Kurdish demands rest on two factors which appear to work in their favor:
First, the Kurds argue that they have enjoyed autonomy since 1991. They
have their own elected parliaments, governments, flag, security forces,
newspapers and television stations as well their own schools and
universities where Kurdish is the language of instruction...
Second, they have established a strong presence in the Governing
Council and built alliances with some elements of the political
spectrum in Iraq during years of opposition to Saddam's regime. Some of
these alliances are proving ephemeral but not entirely lost.
Plebiscite
The opponents of federalism demand that the creation of a federated
Kurdistan be subject to a plebiscite by the Iraqi people. The Kurds
argue that such a plebiscite is unjust because it throws the issue into
the hands of voters who have no appreciation or understanding of the
suffering of the Kurdish people in the last 80 years. Moreover, a new
generation has grown up in Kurdistan who do not speak a word of Arabic
and who do not see Baghdad as their capital. Due to racial
discrimination, not many Kurds have received university education in
Iraqi universities outside of Kurdistan. In order to reintegrate the
Kurdish population into the Iraqi social fabric; the Kurds insist that
their historical rights must be given full recognition.(9)
The Kurds accept the principle of plebiscite for the city of Kirkuk
provided it is conducted after the return home of all the former city
dwellers expelled by the Saddam regime and provided it is conducted
under international supervision.(10)
The State Administrative Law
After years of oppression and sacrifices, the Kurds made the most
tangible progress under the State Administrative Law for Iraq, the
equivalent of a transitional constitution, which was signed by all
members of the Iraqi Governing Council on March 8, 2004. The following
are some highlights of the law which affect the future of the Kurds in
the Iraqi state.
Para. 4 calls for the establishment of a republican, federal,
democratic, multiparty system of government in Iraq, and the division
of power between the central government in Baghdad and the provinces.
Para. 9 establishes that Arabic and Kurdish are the two official
languages of Iraq, including the official gazette, national assembly,
the council of minister, and the courts
Para. 53 recognizes the government of the Turkistan Region as the
official government of the territories by that government on March 19,
2003 [the start of the war in Iraq] and includes the provinces of
Dhouk, Erbil Sulayminayya, Kirkuk, and the cities of Dyala and Nainawa.
Para. 54 gives the Kurdistan government the power to control internal
peace and order and the right to levy taxes and fees inside the region.
Para. 61 (c) states that the draft constitution shall not be deemed
approved if it is not approved by two thirds of the voters in three
provinces.
It is a significant list of rights and powers granted to the Kurds
under the law. However, it was the last paragraph 61(c) which has
proved to be the most controversial and has coalesced many political
forces against it.
It is viewed as tantamount to granting the Kurds with a veto power over
the approval of the constitution if two thirds of the voters in three
provinces have decided to vote against it. From the Kurdish
perspective, the provision is a "fundamental guarantee" that no
constitution will be promulgated that would deny them any of the rights
enumerated in the other paragraphs of the State Administrative Law.
The issue of Kirkuk is another controversial issue not only because it
is sitting on huge oil reserves but also because there are large Arab
and Turkmen populations in the city, in addition to Christians and
Assyrians, who consider themselves Arabs and who do not wish to be
included under a Kurdish autonomy. The Shi'a bloc in the Iraqi
Governing Council wants to stipulate that the three provinces should be
specified as referring to the Kurdish provinces and that their
rejection of the constitution would apply only to the Kurdish region.
By this amendment they want to deny the Sunni provinces from voting
against the draft constitution.(11)
A leading Sunni member of the governing Council, Ghazi Ujail Al-Yawer,
criticized the Kurdish position: "The Iraqi Kurds have unified their
words and action ... [for] a federal government in their region. Their
demand is new and strange from the perspective of Iraqi politics and,
indeed, from the perspective of the politics of the [Middle East]
region as a whole. The demand is obscure, susceptible to rumors,
suspicions and rigidity... They wish to impose this federalism on the
Iraqi people in the absence of a census, before the conduct of
elections or referendum. They want to impose a racial federalism
whether the Iraqi people want it or not."(12)
In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the Shi'a leading cleric,
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, expressed reservations about 17 paragraphs,
including the controversial 61(c).(13) Al-Sistani went further by
stating his refusal to meet with a United Nations delegation that was
due to arrive in Iraq to discuss the transfer of power unless the
delegation publicly repudiates the State Administrative Law.(14)
The Turkish Factor
The Turkish position has been adamant that federalism in Iraq is
tantamount to the division of Iraq and the creation of a Kurdish state
that would encourage separatist movements among other Kurdish
minorities, particularly that in Turkey. Turkish armed forces went as
far as threatening "a difficult and bloody future" for any federalism
in Iraq based on ethnicity.(15) Turkey is particularly opposed to
the incorporation of the city of Kirkuk into a Kurdish region because
of what they consider as a danger to the Turkmen citizens of the city.
The Turkish ambassador in Iraq declared that the Turkish position has
been conveyed to the CPA, adding that the CPA has no authority to grant
a piece of land to anyone in Iraq.(16) The Kurds themselves have gone
to a great length to assure Turkey that no Kurd who remains on Kurdish
soil would be allowed to carry out any military action against Turkey.
The Kurds are quite convinced that as long as American forces are
present in the area no Turkish army would enter the Kurdish region for
any excuse. (17)
* Nimrod Raphaeli is a Senior Analyst at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
(1) Babil (Iraq), October 16, 2002.
(2) Al-Zaman (Iraq), January 9, 2004.
(3) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 21, 2003.
(4) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 12, 2004.
(5) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 22, 2004.
(6) Al-Hayat (London), February 4, 2004.
(7) Al-Shiraa (Iraq), January 10, 2004.
(8) Al-Taakhi (Iraq), January 11, 2004.
(9) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Londond), January 18, 2004.
(10) Al-Hayat (London), January 6, 2004.
(11) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), March 14, 2004.
(12) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 15, 2004.
(13) Al-Mashriq (Iraq) March 20, 2004.
(14) Al-Zaman (Iraq), March 21, 2003.
(15) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 17, 2004.
(16) Al-Shiraa (Iraq), January 10, 2004.
(17) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 11, 2004.
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