See chronology of events here
Aaron Lerner Date: 1 February 2001
The following is from "First Statement of the Government of Israel submitted to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee" (also known as the Mitchell Committee) on 29 December 2000:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jcb0
C. The visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, 28 September 2000
164. As the preceding review makes clear, the groundwork for violence had been laid by the Palestinian leadership well before the visit by Opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on Thursday, 28 September 2000. The visit was not the cause of the violence. As there has been a good deal of dissembling associated with the visit of Mr Sharon to the Temple Mount, it may be helpful to the Committee if key aspects of this event are described more fully.
165. Mr Sharon, the leader of the Opposition in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, published his intention to visit the Temple Mount on 24 September 2000, four days prior to the intended visit. The declared purpose of the visit was to examine archaeological sites on the Temple Mount following work that had been carried out by the Muslim Wakf, notably in the area of Solomon's Stables The location of this area within the Temple Mount compound is indicated on Aerial Photograph No.1 appended hereto, which, together with other geographic points, also shows the route taken by Mr Sharon on his visit to the area. At the time of announcing his intention to visit the area, Mr Sharon indicated that he would be accompanied by archaeologists from the Israeli Antiquities Authority.
170. The sensitivity of and risks associated with the proposed visit by Mr Sharon to the Temple Mount were clear to all. It was evident that there would be elements within the Palestinian community who would oppose the visit and might seek to prevent it. The timing of the visit was also sensitive insofar as it preceded by only a few days the Jewish New Year, a period in which Jewish families traditionally visit the Western Wall which stands at the foot of the Temple Mount.
171. While the possibility of prohibiting the visit was considered, freedom of access to "sacred places" is expressly enshrined in Israeli legislation and Supreme Court decisions. Freedom of movement of Members of the Knesset, save for reasons of national security, is also expressly provided for in Israeli law. The scope for prohibiting the visit was thus limited.
172. Against this background, the relevant Israeli authorities consulted with the Palestinian side. These consultations took place both at the level of officials and at the political level. The purpose of the consultations was to identify the possible risks associated with the visit, to reassure the Palestinian side that the Israeli authorities would do whatever they could to limit problematical aspects of the visit, and to try to convince the Palestinian side not to encourage violence and demonstrations during the visit. In this
regard, it was indicated that the visit would take place early in the morning, would be relatively short and would not include visits to particular Muslim Holy Sites. The Palestinian side was presented with the route of the proposed visit - as indicated on Aerial Photograph No.1. It was affirmed that Mr Sharon would visit the area in the same way as would any non-Muslim visitor (the Temple Mount being generally open to public access). The relevant Israeli authorities also promised that no attempt would be made to restrict Muslim freedom of access to the Temple Mount during the visit. In short, every effort was made by the Israeli side to minimise the potential for friction and to forestall the
possibility of violence.
173. The consultations with the Palestinian side included a telephone
conversation on the proposed visit between Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo
Ben-Ami and the Head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Organisation in
the
West Bank, Jibril Rajoub, on 26 September 2000 in which, by reference to the
contemporaneous note of the conversation, Mr Rajoub indicated "if Mr Sharon
refrains from entering the Mosques on Temple Mount, there wouldn't be any
problem." On the basis of this consultation and other measures adopted, the
visit was not prohibited.
174. While contacts between Israeli officials and members of the Palestinian Authority suggested that the visit would pass peacefully, residual concerns about violence remained. Of relevance in this context was a communique published by Hamas on 27 September, the day prior to the visit, stating inter alia as follows:
"The Jews have clearly and unequivocally declared their ambition in continuing occupation of Jerusalem and the holy Aqsa Mosque. It is quite clear that plans to demolish the Aqsa Mosque and build the so-called Jewish temple in its place were no longer the aspirations of limited or extremist groups in the Zionist society, as some believed. ...
We call on our people to head tomorrow Thursday to the holy Aqsa Mosque to confront the terrorist Sharon and prevent him from entering the Mosque and its yards and to check his attempt to desecrate it regardless of sacrifices. Let the masses have a say in rejecting and aborting plans and aggressive ambitions of the Jews and in refusing any agreements or projects that would undermine our people and Nation's rights in Jerusalem, the Aqsa and all sanctities."
175. Other declarations and communiques calling for opposition to the Sharon visit were published by Fatah, the principal political-military grouping within the PLO answerable directly to Yasser Arafat, and by others.
176. On the day of the visit, Muslim morning prayers on the Temple Mount took place at around 5.54 am and passed without incident. From around 7.00 am, political figures - both Israeli supporters and detractors of the visit and Palestinian leaders - began arriving on the scene. Palestinian youth - eventually numbering around 1,500 - also began arriving, shouting slogans in an attempt to inflame the situation. Some 1,500 Israeli police were present at the scene in order to forestall violence.
177. Mr Sharon arrived at the Temple Mount at 7.57 am. There were limited disturbances during the visit, mostly involving stone throwing. The visit lasted 34 minutes, ending at 8.31 am. Mr Sharon visited the site during normal hours in which it was open to tourists. He made no attempt to enter the Mosques.
178. During the remainder of the day, outbreaks of stone throwing continued on the Temple Mount and in the vicinity leaving 28 Israeli policemen injured, three of whom were hospitalised. There are no accounts of Palestinian injuries on that day.
179. Significant and orchestrated violence was initiated by Palestinians the following day, 29 September 2000, following Friday prayers. These events are addressed in detail in Parts V and VI below describing what happened and the policies and practices of the Palestinian side during the conflict.
D. Conclusions in respect of this Part
180. There is a widespread belief, actively advanced by the Palestinian side, that demonstrations by Palestinian youth took place spontaneously in reaction to the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. That belief is fundamentally flawed. The visit by Mr Sharon, however sensitive, was not the cause of the violence. It was an excuse for a violent campaign, the groundwork for which had already been laid by the Palestinian leadership. The object of the violence was the creation of new facts on the ground - the bringing about of a new reality to bolster the Palestinian position in its relations with Israel. The means to this end were the inevitable Palestinian casualties - inevitable because of the confrontational practices that would be pursued by the Palestinians.
181. The foundations for the present conflict were laid long before Ariel Sharon
announced his intention to visit the Temple Mount. The seeds of the conflict are to be found in the policies pursued by the Palestinian leadership - the hostile propaganda, the military training of Palestinian children, the failure to confiscate illegal weapons, the excessive growth in the numbers of the Palestinian Police, the revolving door policy in respect of terrorist detainees, etc.
182. The immediate causes of the present conflict were thus the significant setbacks to the Palestinian diplomatic agenda from July 2000 - the failure of the Camp David Summit, the widespread perception (including in the Arab world) of Palestinian responsibility for this failure, the cautioning against a unilateral declaration of statehood on 13 September 2000 and the decision of the Palestinian leadership on 10 September 2000 to postpone such a declaration. In the face of these developments, violence was a means to an end; the regaining of the diplomatic initiative.