NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SIGNED AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS: A RECORD OF BAD FAITH AND MISCONDUCT

PT 1

[IMRA [Independant Media and Review Analysis] note: The Barak Government's public affairs coordinator, Nahman Shai, released the following "white book" on 20 November 2000. The following is the complete text. Photographs and a graph in the publication have not been included. While the publication was distributed by the Government of Israel at an official meeting with the press, for some reason there is no identifying marking on the publication indicating the source of the publication, the author or that the Government of Israel is in any way associated with the publication]

Editor's note: this document was prepared by IMRA, http://www.tzemach.org/fyi/www.imra.org.il.

Palestinian Authority and P.L.O.

Non-Compliance with signed agreements and commitments:
A record of bad faith and misconduct

November 20 2000

Executive Summary

The present wave of violence - led by the Fatah "Tanzim" - is essentially an attempt by Arafat to achieve, through violence, his maximal political goals: and avoid the choices necessary to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Key assumptions have thus been shattered:

• Arafat's conduct following the Camp David Summit indicates he preferred not to face up to the tough decisions necessary for a historic compromise.
• Instead of responsibility for the welfare of the governed we see him willing to use Palestinian suffering, including the death of children on the frontline (shamelessly exploited).
• Rather than take into account Israeli and Jewish sensitivities (side by side with their own legitimate rights) the Palestinians now prefer to stoke the fires of Islamic "Identity Politics" ("al-Quds is in danger") so as to walk away from the negotiations and replace them by international intervention.

The dynamics of "the struggle" took precedence over Palestinian commitments. Breaches of these obligations include:

• Direct use of violence by Palestinian Police (which Arafat regards, in effect, as the P.A. military forces) in violent clashes. One of the most serious cases, for which P.A. Policemen bear at least a major part of the responsibility, was the lynching of two IDF reservists in Ramallah on October 12,2000.
• Ambivalent attitudes towards terrorism, and at times outright complicity. Tolerance towards the Hamas helped open the floodgates of the terrorist campaign of February-March 1996; In the current crisis, P.A. Preventive Security, let alone the "Tanzim" (militia) of Arafat's Fatah movement, are actively involved in terrorist attacks and security cooperation has been abandoned almost entirely.
• Failure to collect illegal weapons - thousands of which were left, from 1994 onwards in the hands of the Tanzim. Various illegal weapons were sighted in the territories in recent events and during demonstrations and funerals.
• Incitement to Hatred - a key element in the current crisis has been the relentless effort to mobilize "the Arab masses and destabilize the region - asking "where is Saladin"? This comes against the background of a broader pattern of education and public messages, which denigrate the Jews, and reject the possibility of compromise solutions.
• The size of the Palestinian Police force- well over 40,000 on the payroll - remains in breach of the Interim Agreement.
• Palestinian Security Organs Operate Outside the Agreed Areas particularly Preventive Security, acting in East Jerusalem in open breach of the agreements.
• In Gaza Airport, there have been repeated cases of misconduct, which raise questions regarding the illegal use of the Airport.
• On Foreign Relations, the P.A. has been acting in breach of the agreements as to its interim status.
• Economic and Infrastructure agreements and procedures have been regularly ignored.
• Criminal activities on a large scale - from car theft to excise tax fraud - take place under P.A. auspices.
• In the recent crisis, the P.A. failed to protect Jewish Holy places in Nablus and Jericho.

It should be recalled that the P.L.O. was not an "unknown quantity" when it came into the Peace Process: its institutional record - of terrorism, breach of agreements (with Arab governments - Jordan, Lebanon), and abuse of the "governed" in areas under its control - meant that extensive formal commitments were required - beginning with the pledges given to Prime Minister Rabin prior to the signing of the Declaration of Principles. These, however were often interpreted in a slippery way, or honored only when it was expedient for Arafat and the P.A. to do so.

Table of Contents:

1. Why were formal commitments important in the post-1993 peace process?
2. Indications of Essential Bad Faith: Arafat creates a rationale for non-compliance
3. Specific aspects of non-compliance
   • Direct Use of Violence:
   • In the recent crisis;
   • At all times (abductions of Israeli citizens, etc.).
   • Terrorism - ambivalence and complicity
   • Failure to Collect Illegal Weapons.
   • Incitement and the Perpetuation of Hatred.
   • Other Aspects of Palestinian non-compliance:
   • The size of the Palestinian Police
   • Security Organs Operating Outside Agreed Areas
   • Breaches of the Agreed Practice at the Gaza (Dahaniyah) Airport
   • No Action to Implement Policy on Visitors Permits
   • Foreign Relations
   • Economic and Infrastructure Breaches
   • Criminal Activity under P.A. Auspices
   • Failure to Protect Holy Places
4. The Shattered Assumptions
   • An Irreversible Choice for Peace;
   • A Stake in the Welfare of the Governed;
   • Give and Take at the Bilateral Table.
5. Root Causes
   • Arafat's Strategy of Avoiding Choices;
   • Diverting Attention from Domestic Failure;
   • Conspiracy Theories and Miscalculations.